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One of the thorniest issues that contemporary scholars of British India are 
faced with is that of the genesis of the Indian National Congress (1885). 
While some of them believe that the foundation of this first major political 
party on an all-India basis was an inevitable corollary of the circumstances 
that prevailed in the South Asian Sub-continent as a result of British Raj, 
others have held opposing views. In fact, the latter, while championing the 
“safety-valve” theory, are convinced that the birth of this political 
organization was nothing more than a British stratagem aimed at forestalling 
an imminent popular uprising among the colonial subjects. Thus, the aim of 
this article is to set out the views and arguments of both camps of scholars.  
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By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the British Empire in India 
witnessed the birth of a major widely-based political party on Western model, 
the Indian National Congress. This move represented a milestone in India’s 
struggle for freedom from the yoke of colonial rule, since it was the first party 
of its kind to see the light of the day throughout the whole British Empire, 
which, later on, inspired other nationalist leaders worldwide to found similar 
organizations –probably the best example illustrating this was the creation, by 
1912, of the African National Congress in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, the genesis of this party has often been put into question. In 
fact, the origin of the Indian National Congress has been, till nowadays, a 
much-debated subject among many scholars dealing with the political history of 
British India. The latter are divided into two camps: on the one hand, there are 
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those who assumed that this political party was born as a result of governmental 
machinations and, on the other hand, there are those who see things differently. 
Hence, the aim of this article is to set out the views and arguments of both 
camps. Yet, before dealing with this point, it is more than useful to set out the 
background and circumstances which led to the formation of this political 
movement. 
The post-1857 era, up to the establishment of the Indian National Congress 
in 1885, is seen by many scholars as one of the darkest phases in the history of 
South Asia under colonial rule. Commenting on this period, the Indian 
historian, Niranjan M. Khilnani, pointed out: “The more carefully we study the 
historical records, the more clearly we find out that this period between 1858 
and 1885 was one of stress and strain” (Khilnani 1987:35).  
Indeed, the foundation of the Indian National Congress came as a 
culmination of a series of unfortunate events going back to the 1860’s. In other 
words, in the couple of decades that preceded the birth of this first Indian 
political movement on Western model, British India was shrouded in a socio-
economic and political malaise, which caused widespread disaffection among 
the local population and in particular, the Western-educated elite. This malaise 
was brought about by a number of factors ranging from disastrous famines to 
colonial legislation. 
According to many contemporaries, the Indian Sub-continent was subject 
to recurrent famines during the 1860’s and 1870’s, which brought about large 
scale deaths caused by starvation as well as wreaked havoc on the purchasing 
power of the local population, who were already finding it too hard to make 
both ends meet. In this respect, M. A. Karandikar affirmed that the famine of 
the late 1860’s, which was followed by outbreak of cholera and smallpox, 
caused the death of 25 per cent of the population inhabiting the famine affected 
areas in the region of Orissa, and the price of wheat skyrocketed by more than 
300 per cent (Karandikar 1968:151). Meanwhile, Akshayakumar R. Desai 
claimed that the most severe famine was that of 1877, which affected an area of 
200,000 square miles and a population of thirty-six millions (Desai 1959:291). 
It is worthwhile to mention the fact that famine was not the only factor 
responsible for the Indian impoverishment. In fact, Akshayakumar R. Desai 
attributed such a condition to the increasing burden of land revenue and rent, 
which led to indebtedness among many farmers who could no longer cope with 
the situation (Desai 1959). Corroborating this fact, M. A. Karandikar cited 
Wilfrid Scawen, a British official, who visited the Indian Sub-continent in the 
early 1880’s, as having ascribed the existing situation to the following factors: 
… the excessive land assessment which had impoverished the people and had 
thrown the farmers in indebtedness; taxes on new wells discouraged sinking 
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of wells; the exorbitant salt tax robbed the very poor; agriculture became an 
unprofitable business and large areas of land were left barren … (Karandikar 
1968:151)  
To add insult to injury, at the time when the Indian population was 
experiencing such a plight, the British held, in 1877, a spectacular and 
extravagant official ceremony, or Durbar, in Delhi in honour of Queen Victoria 
in order to proclaim her as the Empress of India. According to Akshayakumar 
R. Desai, this act of carelessness intensified to a great extent the resentment of 
the native people (Desai 1959:291). 
Meanwhile, colonial legislation contributed to the highest degree to the 
widening gulf between the inhabitants of India and the British Colonial 
Government in post-Revolt era. The passage of the Vernacular Press Act of 
1878, for instance, which restricted the freedom of the Indian press, was one of 
the many measures that alienated the Indian intelligentsia, particularly the 
Hindus. This Act, which was passed during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, 
came as a fulfilment to a claim, made several years before by Sir George 
Campell, a Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in the early 1870’s, that the local 
vernacular press was becoming a serious threat to the continuity of British rule 
in India, and hence, “a special legislation was required” to deal with it (Lovett 
1988:21-22). Commenting on the threat represented by the local vernacular 
press, V. Lovett reported on a member of the British Government in India as 
claiming that: 
… there is a large and increasing class of native newspapers which would 
seem to exist only for the sake of spreading seditious principles, of bringing 
the Government and its European officers into contempt, and of exciting 
antagonism between the governing race and the people of the country. (apud 
Lovett 1988:22) 
Another example could be seen in the defeat of the Ilbert Bill of 1883. This 
Bill, which was presented by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, a law member of Viceroy 
Lord Ripon’s (1827-1909) Council and backed up by the latter, aimed at 
“rectifying an anomaly in the Criminal Procedure Code” (Khilnani 1987:46) by 
providing for an equal treatment of Indians and Europeans in the sphere of 
criminal jurisdiction. In other words, this Bill, if passed, would allow Indian 
judges to try Europeans for their offences in the country on the same footing as 
their Indian counterparts (Kadri 1982:11). 
This Bill was vehemently opposed by the white community in India, 
especially the British, who regarded such a proposal as an element that would 
“imperil the liberties of British non-officials” (Lovett 1988:26). Consequently, 
they organized a Defence Association as well as fierce and vigorous agitations 
throughout the whole Sub-continent, which were often violent (Sharma 1998:7). 
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In addition to that, Akshayakumar R. Desai stated that a faction of these 
European agitators was hatching a plot to “put the Viceroy on board a steamer 
… and send him to England via the Cape” (Desai 1959:292). 
In the meantime, it should be noted that these European agitators were 
driven by their sense of belonging to a race that was superior to that of the 
natives of the Sub-continent and could not imagine themselves being tried by 
judges who belonged to an inferior race, namely Indians. The following 
passage, said by a British contemporary of high standing in the Indian Sub-
continent, reflects the assumption that was widespread among the European 
community there: 
It is this consciousness of inherent superiority of the European which has 
won for us India. However well educated and clever a native be, and however 
brave he may have proved himself, I believe that no rank which we can 
bestow upon him would cue him to be considered as an equal by the British 
officer. (Desai 1959) 
 Faced with such a situation, the Indians tried to conduct a counter-
agitation in support of the Ilbert Bill. However, they were asked to “mind their 
own business” and that they should not interfere in a controversy that was 
“intimately” between the Viceroy, namely Lord Ripon, and the Europeans 
settlers. In a speech given during a public meeting in Bombay, Sir Pherozeshah 
M. Mehta (1845-1915), an Indian leader, regretfully said: 
We were told that we have no concern with this bill at all and that it is only a 
little matter between Lord Ripon and the Europeans in India, in which the 
parties have got rather hot with each other, and that in fact we have no locus 
standi at all to take part in the argument. (Mehta 1998:8) 
Another cause for the failure of the Indians in facing such anti-Ilbert Bill 
campaign could be attributed to the absence of any form of organization among 
them, which rendered their efforts useless (Mehta 1998:7). As a result, the 
British Colonial Government was, ultimately, in the obligation of reformulating 
the Bill, and hence, the whole project was nipped in the bud. Commenting on 
the Bill, H. D. Sharma stated that “though the bill was not withdrawn, it was 
changed beyond recognition and served no useful purpose when passed into 
law” (Mehta 1998).  
This move aroused so much anger among the Indians, who became utterly 
disillusioned about the impartiality of the Colonial Government. In fact, in their 
eyes, the fact that the British authorities in India bowed to the demands of the 
European agitators was tantamount to racial discrimination (Desai 1959:292).  
This racial discrimination could be seen in the fact that most of the higher 
positions in the colonial administration were reserved for the Europeans; and 
that was despite Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858 –in which she vowed to 
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allow native Indians with appropriate qualifications to hold higher posts and to 
take part in the administrative management of their country alongside the 
British officials (Feiling 1972:929). According to Akshayakumar R. Desai, this 
was because the colonial authorities in India were tacitly determined, out of 
caution, to keep the upper hand in all administrative matters. In fact, it was a 
sina qua non for the maintenance of their Empire in India to retain power in 
their hands, as T. R Metcalf put it: “No matter how far Indian employment 
might be extended, the ultimate controlling power had always to remain in 
British hands” (Metcalf 1965:287-288). 
Thus, by the early 1880’s, the situation in the Indian society was on the 
brink of exploding.1 Moreover, the circumstances in the Sub-continent in the 
wake of the happenings of 1857, up to the early 1880’s, taught the Indians, and 
particularly the Hindu intelligentsia, the fact that nothing could be achieved 
without an organized effort. Indeed, the defeat of the Ilbert Bill, among other 
reasons, made the Indians realize, for the first time, the fact that sporadic efforts 
of individuals were useless as well as fruitless; hence, they learnt the 
importance and value of organization (Sharma 1998:7). This was an important 
factor that led to the establishment of the first organized nationwide political 
party speaking one voice, and representing the whole inhabitants of India –
though except the Muslim community. 
Meanwhile, as has been mentioned before, the genesis of the Indian 
National Congress was shrouded in mystery and has been subject to controversy 
among many scholars, particularly with regard to who was behind the 
emergence of this first Indian political party on an All-India basis. In fact, some 
historians believe that the Indian National Congress was a British creation, and 
that the reason behind it was the fact that the Colonial Government in India was 
aware of the smouldering discontent among the native population and feared the 
consequences. In other words, it is often said that the British officials in South 
Asia had the premonition that some sort of a rebellion on the pattern of the 
Great Revolt of 1857 was rumbling in the distance as a result of the growing 
discontent in the Sub-continent, hence the raison d’être for a national party as a 
preventive move to forestall such an imminent apocalypse. As confirmed by 
Palme Dutt, who asserted that: 
La formation du Congrès national représentait dans l’esprit du gouvernement 
un effort pour faire échec à une révolution menaçante ou plutôt pour la 
devancer. (Dutt 1957:125) 
 
1 In this respect, Akshayakumar R. Desai affirmed that “the political and economic discontent of 
the Indian people which had been gathering steadily … almost threatened to reach an explosive 
point by 1883” (Desai 1959: 293). 
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To back up their standpoint, the protagonists of this opinion keep alluding 
to the fact that the founder of this organization was a British resident in India 
and a former officer in the Indian Civil Servant, Allen Octave Hume (1829-
1912), who was thought to be the de facto originator of the idea of establishing 
the Indian National Congress (Ghosh 1989:40), and who, as put by Judith M. 
Brown, “gave generous support from his own pocket” to make it real (Brown 
1991:176).  
According to Akshayakumar R. Desai, Allen Octave Hume, who served in 
the Indian Civil Service up to 1882, was said to have got hold of the very 
voluminous secret police reports –seven volumes– which acquainted him with 
the growing of popular disaffection and the spreading of underground 
conspiratorial organization (Desai 1959:294). In this respect, Palme Dutt 
affirmed that most of these police documents reported conversations heard 
between people from lower classes which reflected that, to quote Allen Octave 
Hume, these people: 
… ressentaient le caractère désespéré de la situation existante, qu’ils étaient 
convaincus qu’ils allaient mourir de faim et qu’ils voulaient faire quelque 
chose. Ils allaient faire quelque chose, au coude à coude, et ce quelque chose 
signifiait la violence. (apud Dutt 1957:127) 
Based on these secret police reports, Allen Octave Hume sensed the 
imminence of a huge uprising in the making. Describing Hume’s and other 
Englishmen’s anxiety, Oroon K. Ghosh wrote: 
Hume, like other British people in India, was in constant fear of uprisings… 
There might be civil commotion and civil disturbances in the bazaars and in 
the native areas of towns where the British resided. And the contagion might 
spread to the police and even the army, leading possibly, not only to the 
1857-1859 of India, but to a repetition of the 1776-1783 of North America. 
(Ghosh 1989:40)  
This prompted him to get in touch with the then Viceroy, Lord Dufferin 
(1826-1902), at Simla,2 and advised him of the necessity to find a way to 
weather this crisis safe and sound. One of the solutions that Allen Octave Hume 
proposed to Lord Dufferin was to set up a political party on an All-India basis 
which could serve as a safe outlet, or a “safety-valve” (Desai 1959:294). In 
other words, Allen Octave Hume felt the need for the setting up of a political 
party that would serve as a forum where the educated Indians could voice out 
their pent-up grievances peacefully and constitutionally, without resorting to 
violence or anarchical means; hence, in the opinion of this Englishman, it was a 
 
2 “Simla” was India’s summer capital during British rule from 1865 to 1939. This was due to its 
cool climate and beautiful landscape. Encyclopaedia Britannica, UK, 2001, CD-ROM Edition. 
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good idea to have such a forum where, as M. A. Karandikar put it, the attention 
of the educated Indians would be diverted from secret conspiracies as a result of 
the “great and growing forces generated by our own action” (Karandikar 
1968:153). In this respect, drawing on the private papers and correspondence of 
Allen Octave Hume, Akshayakumar R. Desai cited him as saying: 
The ferment... was at work with a radically increasing intensity, and it 
became of paramount importance to find for its products an overt and 
constitutional channel for discharge, instead of leaving them fester as they 
had already commenced to do, under the surface. (apud Desai 1959:294) 
Furthermore, Akshayakumar R. Desai claimed that in addition to its role as 
a “safety-valve”, Allen Octave Hume believed, this forum could be used by the 
Colonial Government as a means through which it could collect information 
about the views and reactions of the educated Indians with regard to the British 
policies in India (Desai 1959).  
In the meantime, in an attempt to further substantiate their point of view, 
the “pro-safety-valve” explanation scholars argued that the best indication 
confirming the “Britishness” of the origin of the Indian National Congress is the 
fact that its founders did not demand self-government for India; hence, they 
were, as referred to by some Indian extremists, “anti-nationalist” as well as 
“compromising, if not loyalist, vis-à-vis imperialism” (Chandra et al. 1989:61).  
In fact, it should be noted that the main objectives of this political party at 
the time of its foundation were by no means anti-imperialist and were 
characterized by the demand for isolated reforms, which can be summarized 
into the following points: the enlargement of the Legislative Councils, the 
inclusion of more educated Indians in the public services, the separation 
between the executive and judicial functions, the reduction in military 
expenditure, commissions for Indians in the army, and so on (Mehrotra 
1965:31). In this regard, Sanjay Seth observed that the Congress: 
resolutions opposing government action or inaction would not “condemn” but 
rather “regret”; and resolutions proposing some course of action or remedy to 
the government would not “demand” but rather “suggest” or, at the most, 
“urge.” (Seth 1999:102) 
Then, the same scholar reported on a Hindu extremist as referring to “the 
general timidity of the Congress” and “its fear of too deeply displeasing our 
masters” (Seth 1999:102). 
Meanwhile, Bipan Chandra et al., who vehemently opposed the “safety-
valve” theory, regretfully reported on Lala Lajpat Rai, a Hindu extremist leader 
in early twentieth century, as saying in his Young India, published in 1916, that 
the Indian National Congress was a “product of Lord Dufferin’s brain” and that 
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it was founded more with the object of safeguarding the very foundations of the 
British Empire against any potential threat to its stability than with that of 
winning political liberty for India. Hence, Lala Lajpat Rai concluded, the 
interests of the British were primary and those of the Indians came only second 
(Chandra et al. 1989:62). 
Besides, with regard to his view of Allen Octave Hume, Lala Lajpat Rai 
claimed that though he was known for being a lover of freedom who sought 
political freedom for India within the British Empire, he was, after all, an 
“English patriot” (Chandra et al. 1989:64).  
On the other hand, the opponents of the “safety-valve” theory, mostly 
Hindu scholars, rejected all of the arguments mentioned above, which they 
labelled as “totally inadequate and misleading” (Chandra, Tripathi & De 
1983:57). Prominent among whom was the distinguished Indian historian – 
already cited above– Bipan Chandra, who took the lead in denying the 
assumption that the Indian National Congress was nothing more than a “safety-
valve” designed by the British administration in order to absorb the seething 
discontent among the native population. He further stated that this political 
organization was a creation by the Indians who were opposed to the exploitation 
of their country in favour of British interests, and who felt the need for an 
organization whereby they could struggle for their country’s political and 
economic progress (Chandra, Tripathi & De 1983).  
In response to those who claimed that Allen Octave Hume was using the 
Indian intelligentsia to avert an imminent social explosion, Bipan Chandra et al. 
stated that it was the Indian founders who were using him as a “lightening 
conductor” (Chandra, Tripathi & De 1983:57). Lending support to Bipan 
Chandra et al., Oroon K. Ghosh described the function of the “lightening 
conductor” as being a metal rod or wire fixed to an exposed part of a mast to 
divert electricity into the earth or sea, then said: “Hume was used by the 
Congress in that way” (Ghosh 1989:41).  
To put it differently, the Indian nationalists used Hume in the sense that he 
helped them fulfil their long time dream of setting up a nationalist party on an 
all-India basis. Oroon K. Ghosh quoted Gopal Krishna Gokhale, an early 
twentieth-century Hindu nationalist leader, as saying in retrospect:  
No Indian could have started the Indian National Congress –If an Indian had 
– come forward to start such a movement, the officials would not have 
allowed it to come into existence. If the founder of the Congress had not been 
a distinguished ex-official, such was the distrust of political agitation in those 
days that the authorities would have at once found some way or other of 
suppressing the movement. (apud Ghosh 1989:41) 
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On the other hand, Bipan Chandra went on defending those Indians who 
took part in the founding of the Congress, who were referred to by the “pro-
safety-valve” scholars as “anti-nationalists.” He said: 
They were patriotic men of high character and were in no way stooges of the 
foreign government. They co-operated with Hume because they did not want 
to arouse official hostility to their early political efforts and they hoped that a 
retired Civil Servant’s active presence would allay official suspicions. 
(Chandra, Tripathi & De 1983:57)  
Regarding Lala Lajpat Rai‘s contention that the Indian National Congress 
was a “product of Lord Dufferin’s brain,” Bipan Chandra et al. argued that the 
perusal of Lord Dufferin’s private papers would put an end to such a myth 
(Chandra et al. 1989:69-70). This was confirmed by A. Read and D. Fisher, 
who argued that this Viceroy had no part in the formation of the Congress, and 
that like the other British officials, he regarded it with suspicion (Read & Fisher 
1998:73). To back up their statement, A. Read and D. Fisher quoted Lord 
Dufferin as saying to another British official “in what way the happy despatch 
may best be applied to the Congress, (for) we cannot allow the Congress to 
continue to exist” (Read & Fisher 1998). 
Furthermore, A. Read and D. Fisher contended that the story of the seven-
volume police report –warning of an impending uprising in the Sub-continent– 
that Allen Octave Hume had supposedly seen was untrue (Read & Fisher 1998). 
In this regard, Bipan Chandra et al. commented that “so deeply rooted had 
become the belief in Hume’s volumes … that a large number of historians … 
devoted a great deal of time and energy searching for them in the National 
Archives” (Chandra et al. 1989:65). 
In addition to all that, according to Oroon K. Ghosh, Allen Octave Hume 
was a person who believed in occultism and mysticism (Ghosh 1989:41). 
Moreover, he was said to have once disclosed to Lord Dufferin’s predecessor, 
Lord Ripon, the fact that he was in touch with some people with supernatural 
powers, that he referred to as “ethereal gurus”, who had used their occult 
powers to save Europe during the revolutionary years of 1848 and the British 
Empire in India during the bloody happenings of 1857 (Read & Fisher 
1998:72).  
In the mind of Allen Hume, it was these gurus, “men of the highest quality 
who … have purged themselves from earthly desires, and fixed their desires on 
the highest good,” who, with the help of their chelas, or disciples, were 
acquainted with all that was going on “under the surface” and could easily 
influence the course of events anywhere on the earth (Chandra et al. 1989:66). 
Hence, these gurus, being aware of the imminent unrest in British India, got in 
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touch with Hume, who had access to the Government officials in India, in order 
to “avert a catastrophe” (Chandra et al. 1989). 
Allen Octave Hume further stated that hardly anybody in India knew of the 
existence of such supernatural people due to the fact that “absolute secrecy was 
an essential feature in their lives” (Chandra et al. 1989). Therefore, this made 
him fail to show any material evidence about the police reports contained in the 
“famous” seven volumes to Lord Dufferin. In this respect, A. Read and D. 
Fisher affirmed that when Hume talked to the Viceroy about his advisers and 
informants, he did not mention that they had “no physical reality” and that they 
only existed “on an astral plane, or at best in some secret Tibetan Shangri-La” 
(Read & Fisher 1998:72-3). 
In a word, whether a “safety-valve” or not, the debate is still going on. Yet, 
the Indian National Congress was there and its founders claimed that it 
represented, and spoke on behalf of the whole population of India. Moreover, 
although this nationalist party had a mild, hesitant –as well as doubtful– 
beginning, twentieth-century history proved that it was thanks to its struggle 
that India got its independence from British raj by 1947.  
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